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COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 
Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer∗ 
 
“An independent judiciary guarantees every citizen access to a 
branch of government designed to protect the rights and liberties 
afforded by federal and state constitutions and to resolve disputes 
peacefully and impartially.” 1 
I.  REPORT ON THE ABA COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY 
We approach the centennial of one of the most famous critiques of 
the legal profession with a new set of challenges facing the judiciary.  
When Roscoe Pound delineated “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 
with the Administration of Justice” in a 1906 speech to the American 
Bar Association, he attributed the dissatisfaction to what citizens decried 
as “the necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules.”2 
The “arbitrary technicalities,”3 as Pound described them, are still a 
frustration for those who represent themselves in legal disputes or those 
untrained in the liberties protected by those technicalities.  Pound also 
noted that the public is frustrated by the slow pace of change in the law 
and by the “restraint and regulation”4 embodied in the law. 
Pound’s observations are still valid, but modern circumstances have 
 
∗ Thomas J. Moyer was first elected Chief Justice of Ohio in 1986 and has served as President of the 
Conference of Chief Justices.  He was a member of the American Bar Association Commission on 
Standards for State Judicial Selection and testified before a 2001 public hearing in Detroit of the 
ABA Commission on the 21st Century.  Chief Justice Moyer testified in support of Ohio House Bill 
1, which required full disclosure of contributions to non-candidate campaign groups. 
 1. American Bar Association, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar Association 
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Executive Summary at iii (2003) [hereinafter Justice in 
Jeopardy]. 
 2. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
Speech to the American Bar Association (1906) in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
INSPIRATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL READINGS 221 (Kathleen M. Sampson, ed. 2004). 
 3. Id. at 220. 
 4. Id. at 225. 
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resulted in a broader dissatisfaction with the judiciary brought about by 
an increasingly partisan judicial selection process and a growing 
misperception that the judicial system is biased in favor of the wealthy 
and well-connected.  Public opinion polls have also found widespread 
public concern with the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. 
A statistical portrait of public perception of the judiciary is 
contained in a 1999 survey by the National Center for State Courts and 
the Hearst Corporation, How the Public Views the State Courts.5  The 
survey was based on interviews with 1,826 randomly selected citizens, 
including an over-sampling of 300 African-Americans and 300 
Hispanic-Americans.6 
The survey found that 75 percent of respondents had confidence in 
the courts in their community, but a majority expressed skepticism about 
judges who are elected.7  Seventy-eight percent of those surveyed agreed  
that “[e]lected judges are influenced by having to raise campaign 
funds,”8 and 81 percent agreed that ‘“judges’ decisions are influenced by 
political considerations.”9 
The significant role of campaign contributions has only escalated 
since the release of the National Center survey.  In 2004 candidates for 
state supreme court seats raised $42 million, nearly 45 percent more than 
was raised in 2002, according to preliminary statistics compiled by the 
judicial campaign monitoring group Justice at Stake.10  And in a single 
race for the Supreme Court of Illinois, candidates raised more than $9.3 
million, more than the amounts raised in 19 of the 34 races for the 
United States Senate.11 
In a 2004 race for a seat on the Supreme Court of West Virginia, 
candidate spending reached $2.8 million, and an additional $5.5 million 
was spent by groups unaffiliated with the candidates.12 
Much of the increase has been spent on television advertising.  
According to national statistics compiled by the Brennan Center for 
Justice, supreme court candidates in 2004 purchased more than $21 
 
 5. National Center for State Courts, How the Public Views the State Courts: A 1999 National 
Survey, (May 14, 1999) available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ Res_AmtPTC_ 
PublicViewCrtsPub.pdf (last visited April 14, 2005). 
 6. Id. at 11. 
 7. Id. at 12. 
 8. Id. at 42. 
 9. Id. at 41. 
 10. Justice at Stake Campaign, 2004 State Supreme Court Election Overview (2005) available 
at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASElection2004SummaryNEW.pdf (last visited April 14, 
2005). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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million in air time, with television spending for the four seats on the 
Supreme Court of Ohio reaching nearly $7 million, the highest state total 
in the country.13 
The Brennan Center also found that negative advertising is 
prominent in television advertisements in supreme court races: 
In 2004, close to one-quarter of the spots were negative in tone. The 
number of attack ad airings increased more than 400% from 2002 and 
almost doubled from 2000. Interest groups continue to sponsor more 
negative ads, with 60% of all attack ads paid for by groups, and 53% 
of interest group ads negative in tone.  Most (56%) political party ads 
were also negative.14 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White and subsequent federal court decisions relating to 
judicial campaign speech have removed many of the restraints on what a 
judicial candidate might say in advertising and campaign appearances.15  
While many candidates have unilaterally abided by the previous 
standards, some candidates have chosen to publicly discuss their position 
on issues that could come before the court. 
Prior to the most recent supreme court campaigns, it was apparent 
to many in the legal community that steps must be taken to reverse the 
trends of increased political activity in judicial campaigns and decreased 
public trust of the courts.  In 1999, for example, the National Center for 
State Courts held the National Conference on Public Trust and 
Confidence in the Justice System which developed a National Action 
Plan to identify issues affecting public trust of the judiciary.16  In 2000, 
the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial 
Independence Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards issued 
its report, Standards on State Judicial Selection, which set forth 
recommendations to improve the judicial selection process in states that 
elect members of the judiciary.17  Various states also have undertaken 
 
 13. Brennan Center, BUYING TIME 2004: Total Amount Spent on Judicial Advertising Peaks 
at $21 Million (November 18, 2004), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/ 
releases_2004/pressrelease_2004_ 1118.html (last visited April 14, 2005). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that “[t]he 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates for judicial election 
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues violates the First Amendment.”). 
 16. National Center for State Courts, National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in 
the Justice System, National Action Plan: A Guide for State and National Organizations (2000) 
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC_NatlActionPlanPub.pdf 
(last visited April 14, 2005). 
 17. American Bar Association, Standards on State Judicial Selection: Report of the ABA 
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efforts to improve public trust of the courts and to address issues related 
to their respective judicial selection process. 
In 2002, American Bar Association President Alfred P. Carlton 
convened the Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary “to study, report 
and make recommendations to ensure fairness, impartiality and 
accountability in state judiciaries.”18 
During public hearings held in Detroit, Philadelphia, Portland 
(Oregon) and Austin, Commission members heard from a broad range of 
citizens, lawyers, judges, elected officials, business executives, and 
researchers.19  A national colloquium also addressed the politicalization 
of the judiciary and how other trends affect the administration of the 
courts.20 
The Commission concluded in its final report that the profile of the 
courts has been raised by an ever-increasing case load of high-profile 
social, economic and business issues: 
A number of factors and trends have led to the excessive politicization 
of state courts.  Among these are the proliferation of controversial 
cases generally; the rediscovery of state constitutions as a basis to 
litigate constitutional rights and responsibilities; the increases in 
caseload; the interposition of intermediate appellate courts between 
trial courts and courts of last resort; the spread of the two-party system; 
the emergence of single-issue groups; and the presence of a skeptical 
and conflicted public.  Additional challenges for the judiciary include 
changes in classes of litigants, including a trend towards pro se 
litigation and its impact on the role of the trial judge; changes in the 
demographic composition of America, with concomitant impact on the 
public’s confidence in the courts; and changes in the role of the courts, 
including the rise of problem-solving courts.21 
The Commission report provides a full discussion on the above 
issues which will not be repeated here due to the scope of this review.  
But the overall findings of the Commission conclude that these issues 
are “placing the fair and impartial administration of justice at risk.”22 
The report serves as a clarion bell that our system of justice is in need of 
 
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards 
(July 2000). 
 18. Justice in Jeopardy, supra note 1, Executive Summary at i. 
 19. Id. at Appendix B. 1 Roster of Witnesses and Faculty Commission Hearings and National 
Colloquium. 
 20. Id. at Appendix B.  3 Roster of Witnesses and Faculty Commission Hearings and National 
Colloquium. 
 21. Id. at Executive Summary, ii. 
 22. Id. 
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clear, definitive action to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, 
while restoring public trust and confidence in the courts: 
The promise of America is broken if the public thinks that judges are 
captured by special interests, controlled by the wealthy and powerful, 
and unconcerned about the rights of racial, ethnic and political 
minorities.  Our system of justice must contribute to fulfilling that 
promise.23 
II.  ENDURING PRINCIPLES 
The Commission developed an extensive set of principles which 
should be the starting point of any effort to enhance the independence of 
the judiciary: 
 
• Judges should uphold the law. 
• Judges should be independent. 
• Judges should be impartial. 
• Judges should possess the appropriate temperament and 
character. 
• Judges should possess the appropriate capabilities and 
credentials. 
• Judges and the judiciary should have the confidence of the 
public. 
• The judicial system should be racially diverse and reflective of 
the society it serves. 
• Judges should be constrained to perform their duties in a manner 
that justifies public faith and confidence in the courts. 
III.  PRESERVING THE JUDICIARY’S INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 
A.  Judicial Qualifications, Training and Evaluation 
• States should establish credible, neutral, non-partisan and 
diverse deliberative bodies to assess the qualifications of all 
judicial aspirants so as to limit the candidate pool to those who 
are well qualified.   
• The judicial branch should take primary responsibility for 
providing continuing judicial education.  Said continuing 
judicial education should be required for all judges, and state 
 
 23. Justice in Jeopardy, supra note 1, at Chair’s Introduction, ix. 
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appropriations should be sufficient to provide adequate funding 
for continuing judicial education programs. 
• Congress should fully fund the State Judicial Institute. 
• States should fully fund the National Center for State Courts. 
• States should develop judicial evaluation programs to assess the 
performance of all sitting judges. 
B.  Judicial Ethics and Discipline 
• The American Bar Association should undertake a 
comprehensive review of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 
• The codes of judicial conduct should be actively enforced. 
C.  Diversification of the Justice System 
• Members of the legal profession should expand their use of 
training and recruitment programs to encourage minority 
lawyers to join their firms, they should include them fully in 
firm life, and they should prepare them for pursuing careers on 
the bench following their years in practice. 
• Courts should promote a representative work force and diverse 
court appointments. 
• Courts should act aggressively to ensure that language barriers 
do not limit access to the justice system. 
• Courts should have in place formal policies and processes for 
handling allegations of bias. 
• Information regarding diversity should be shared among the 
courts in a state and among the states. 
• Measurers should be adopted to improve and expand jury pool 
representation. 
D.  Improving Court-Community Relationships 
• Courts should take steps to promote public understanding of and 
confidence in the courts among jurors, witnesses and litigants. 
• Courts should engage and collaborate with the communities of 
which they are a part, by hosting trips to courthouses and by 
having judges and court administrators speak in schools and 
other community settings.  
• The continuation of problem-solving courts as a means to 
promote public confidence in the courts. 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss3/2
MOYER1.DOC 4/29/2005  10:01:38 AM 
2005] COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 561 
IV.  IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 
 The preferred system of state court judicial selection is a 
commission-based appointive system, with the following components: 
• The governor should appoint judges from a pool of judicial 
aspirants whose qualifications have been reviewed and approved 
by a credible, neutral, non-partisan, diverse deliberative body or 
commission. 
• Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age.  Judges so 
appointed should not be subject to reselection processes, and 
should be entitled to retirement benefits upon completion of 
judicial service. 
• Judges should not otherwise be subject to reselection, 
nonetheless remain subject to regular judicial performance 
evaluations and disciplinary processes that include removal for 
misconduct. 
A.  Alternative Recommendations of Systems of Judicial Selection 
• For states that cannot abandon the judicial reselection process 
altogether, judges should be subject to reappointment by a 
credible, neutral, non-partisan, diverse deliberative body.   
• For states that cannot abandon judicial elections altogether, 
elections should be employed only at the point of initial 
selection.   
• For states that retain judicial elections as a means of reselection, 
judges should stand for retention election, rather than run in 
contested elections.   
• For states that retain contested judicial elections as a means to 
select or reselect judges, all such elections should be non-
partisan and conducted in a non-partisan manner.   
• For states that continue to employ judicial elections as a means 
of judicial reselection, judicial terms should be as long as 
possible.   
• For states that use elections to select or reselect judges, states 
should provide the electorate with voter guides on the 
candidate(s).   
• For states that use elections to select or reselect judges, state 
bars or other appropriate entities should initiate a dialogue 
among affected interests, in an effort to deescalate the 
contributions arms race in judicial campaigns.   
• For states that use elections to select or reselect judges, state 
7
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bars or other appropriate entities should reach out to candidates 
and affected interests, in an effort to establish voluntary 
guidelines on judicial campaign conduct. 
• For states that do not abandon contested elections at the point of 
initial selection or reselection, states should create systems of 
public financing for appellate court elections. 
• For states that retain contested judicial elections and do not 
adopt systems of public financing, states should impose limits 
on contributions to judicial candidates. 
B.  Promoting an Independent Judicial Branch that Works Effectively 
with the Political Branches of Government 
• Standards for minimum funding of judicial systems should be 
established.   
• The judiciary’s budget should be segregated from that of the 
political branches, and it should be presented to the legislature 
for approval with a minimum of non-transferable line 
itemization.   
• States should create independent commissions to establish 
judicial salaries.   
• States should create opportunities for regular meetings among 
representatives from all three branches of government to 
promote inter-branch communication as a means to avoid 
unnecessary confrontations on such issues as court funding, 
judicial salaries, and structural reform of the courts.24 
 
The Commission proposals have been incorporated in the efforts of 
many states that have attempted to reform both their judicial selection 
process and judicial administration.  I am most familiar, however, with 
efforts in Ohio and will now describe those efforts. 
In March 2003 other leaders of the bench, bar and civic groups and 
I, organized to convene a forum on judicial impartiality that brought 
together political, civic, and governmental leaders.  Many of these 
leaders have been on opposing sides in this debate but had never met to 
discuss the issues. 
The Ohio State Bar Association joined me in co-sponsoring the 
discussion, and the other conveners were the League of Women Voters 
of Ohio, the John Glenn Institute at Ohio State University and the Ray 
 
 24. Justice in Jeopardy, supra note 1, at Executive Summary, iv – vii. 
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Bliss Institute at the University of Akron.   The forum resulted in general 
agreement that steps must be taken to ensure the integrity of our system 
of selecting and qualifying judges. 
Forum participants formed work groups, chaired by the conveners, 
and developed proposals designed to enhance the independence of the 
judiciary.  The most obvious and widely accepted recommendation 
addressed the current minimum statutory requirement of six years in the 
practice of law to serve as a judge in Ohio. 
The recommendation would require that candidates for common 
pleas court must have a minimum of ten years in the practice of law, 
district appellate judges twelve years, and supreme court justices fifteen 
years of practice.  The current six-year minimum for candidates for 
municipal and county courts would not change. 
A judicial candidate would also be required to complete 40 hours of 
specially designed course work in constitutional law, criminal and civil 
procedure, judicial ethics, and court administration before becoming a 
candidate. 
A second work group proposed extending the terms of office for 
judges, raising the term for common pleas court to ten years, and 
appellate court judges—including justices of the Supreme Court—would 
serve twelve years.  Municipal and county court judges would continue 
to serve six-year terms.  Currently, all judges in the state serve six-year 
terms, leaving Ohio with one of the shortest terms for appellate-level 
judges in the nation. 
The Voter Education-Public Funding Work Group proposed 
increased use of voter guides and the public funding for candidates for 
the Supreme Court.  An electronic voter guide was posted on the Internet 
for candidates running for the four open seats on the Supreme Court of 
Ohio in 2004. 
Attempts at public funding of judicial races in states such as 
Wisconsin and Maine have not been successful, but last year North 
Carolina held its first appellate races that were publicly funded. 
The initial reaction in North Carolina is that public funding was a 
success, as nearly $1.5 million was provided to 12 Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeals candidates. 
Funds raised through a $3 check off on individual tax returns and 
$50 voluntary donations from attorney registrations also funded a voter 
guide that was distributed to every household in the state. 
The fourth work group addressed the issue of campaign finance 
disclosure, an issue addressed by legislation approved during the special 
session of the Ohio General Assembly in December 2004.  Among the 
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important provisions of House Bill 1 is a requirement of full disclosure 
of the supporters of advertisements aired in the closing weeks of a 
campaign, including those groups that are unaffiliated with any 
campaigns, and whose supporters have previously not been publicly 
disclosed. 
The new law would not prevent individuals from writing an 
editorial about a candidate, or prevent any civic group from printing and 
distributing flyers.  It does not affect small, grass-root campaigning.  All 
it requires is that the supporters of expensive media campaigns make 
themselves known by providing voters the information necessary to 
make an informed choice. 
These principles and proposals of the ABA Commission on the 21st 
Century may not be practical in all states, but the ideals represented here 
should serve as a guiding light for all branches of government and the 
citizens for whom they serve. 
The authority of the judiciary derives from beyond the pages of the 
Constitution.  It has roots in the people who authored it and the citizens 
who approved it and live under its rule.  This authority stems from the 
political will that defines a country—the expectations and morals and the 
principles and beliefs of the citizenry. 
This nation was founded on the expectation that individuals have 
rights and that government will protect those rights, not abridge them as 
was the case in feudal Europe. 
Citizens in a democracy also expect that the legislative and 
executive branches of their government will address their desires for the 
betterment of their communities.  Expectations and beliefs are the basis 
for the rule of law, and that is why the authority of the judiciary is both 
resilient and fragile, and it is worthy of respect and dignity.  It must be 
protected and exercised with wisdom and restraint. 
The rule of law and the beliefs of the citizenry are indelibly linked.  
Yale Law School professor Paul Kahn wrote about this in his book The 
Reign of Law.  He writes:  “Faith in the rule of law is not the conclusion 
of a course of reasoning but rather the starting point from which we 
approach the particular problems that arise within the political order.”25  
In other words, law does not engender trust on its own.  Words on paper 
can mean little if they are pushed aside and trampled upon.  It is the 
exercise of those words—bringing life to these words—that gives laws 
and constitutions meaning. 
 
 25. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF AMERICA 2 (1997). 
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The ABA Commission drew into sharp focus the fact that the rule 
of law is jeopardized when citizens are subject to single-issue attack 
advertisements against judicial candidates and when these same citizens 
question the independence of a judicial candidate who must raise 
millions of dollars for a statewide judicial campaign.  The Commission 
concluded that, left uncorrected, these perceptions might lead to even 
more political involvement in the courts.26  If the public loses its faith in 
a judiciary it perceives to have run amok, the obvious solution will be to 
bring the judiciary under greater popular control, to the ultimate 
detriment of judicial independence and the rule of law that judicial 
independence makes possible.27 
Judicial independence is the fulcrum of the balance of power in a 
constitutional democracy.  Courts that are free from outside influences, 
and are perceived by citizens to be independent of political pressures, are 
the surest guardians of the rule of law.  By ensuring that judges are 
independent, impartial, and that they properly maintain the trust and 
confidence of all citizens, we will preserve for future generations a 
vibrant judiciary. 
 
 26. Justice in Jeopardy, supra note 1, at § 2 Recent Developments, 13 (opining that “[a] 
confluence of trends has contributed to making state high courts more politicized.”). 
 27. Id. 
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